A new construction of authentication codes with arbitration and multireceiver from singular symplectic geometry over finite fields is given. The parameters are computed. Assuming that the encoding rules are chosen according to a uniform probability distribution, the probabilities of success for different types of deception are also computed.
Introduction
Let S, E T , E R , and M be four nonempty finite sets, and let f : S × E T → M and g : M × E R → S ∪ {reject} be two maps. The six-tuple S, E T , E R , M, f, g is called an authentication code with arbitration A 2 -code if 1 the maps f and g are surjective;
2 for any m ∈ M and e T ∈ E T , if there is a s ∈ S, satisfying f s, e T m, then such an s is uniquely determined by the given m and e T ;
3 p e T , e R / 0 and f s, e T m implies g m, e R s, otherwise, g m, e R {reject}.
S, E T , E R , and M are called the set of source states, the set of transmitter's encoding rules, the set of receiver's decoding rules, and the set of messages, respectively; f and g are called the encoding map and decoding map, respectively. The cardinals |S|, |E T |, |E R |, and |M| are called the size parameters of the code.
In 1 , Simmons introduced the A 2 -code model to solve the transmitter and the receiver's distrust problem. In 2-4 , some Cartesian authentication codes were constructed from 2 Journal of Applied Mathematics symplectic and unitary geometry; in 5-7 , authentication codes with arbitration based on symplectic and pseudosymplectic geometry were constructed.
The following notations will be fixed throughout this paper: p is a fixed prime. F q is a field with q elements. V F 2ν l q is a singular symplectic space over F q with index ν. e i 1 ≤ i ≤ 2ν l is row vector in V whose ith coordinate is 1 and all other coordinates are 0. Denote by E the l-dimensional subspace of V generated by e 2ν 1 , e 2ν 2 , . . . , e 2ν l . K l denotes the matrix For more concepts and notations used in this paper, refer to 8 .
In an authentication system that permits arbitration, the model includes four attendance: the transmitter, the receiver, the opponent, and the arbiter and includes five attacks.
1 The opponent's impersonation attack: the largest probability of an opponent's successful impersonation attack is P I . Then,
2 The opponent's substitution attack: the largest probability of an opponent's successful substitution attack is P S . Then, P S max m∈M max m / m ∈M |e R ∈ E R | e R ⊂ m, e R ⊂ m | |e R ∈ E R | e R ⊂ m| .
1.3
3 The transmitter's impersonation attack: the largest probability of a transmitter's successful impersonation attack is P T . Then, Notes p e R , e T / 0 implies that any source s encoded by e T can be authenticated by e R .
The First Construction
In this section, we will construct an authentication code with arbitration from singular symplectic geometry over finite fields.
Assume that 2s ≤ 2s 0 < m 0 ≤ ν m 0 , m 0 < 2ν − 1 and 1 ≤ k < l. Let P be a subspace v 1 , v 2 , e 2ν 1 of type 3, 0, 1 in F 2ν 1 q , and let P 0 be a fixed subspace of type m 0 l, s 0 , l which contains P and orthogonal to v 2 , but not orthogonal to v 1 .
Our authentication code is a six-tuple 
2.7
Assuming that the transmitter's encoding rules and the receiver's decoding rules are chosen according to a uniform probability distribution, we can prove that the construction given above results in an A 2 -code. 
. . .
which satisfies
Let e T be a transmitter's rule, that is, a subspace R of type 5, 2, 1 containing P and
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1 is a subspace of type 5, 2, 1 , and M Q R, hence R is a transmitter's encoding rule.
If there is another source state Q such that M Q R , we have that
This implies that the source state Q is uniquely determined by M.
Let n 1 denote the number of subspaces of type 2s 1 k, s, k contained in v 2 ⊥ and containing P , n 2 , the number of subspaces of type m 0 l, s 0 , l contained in v 2 ⊥ and containing a fixed subspace of type 2s 1 k, s, k as above, and n 3 , the number of subspaces of type m 0 l, s 0 , l contained in v 2 ⊥ and containing P and not contained in v 1 ⊥ .
Lemma 2.2. One has
n 1 q 2 ν−s−1 · q 2s−1 l−k · N 2 s − 1 , s − 1; 2 ν − 2 · N k − 1, l − 1 , n 2 N m 0 − 2s 1 , s 0 − s; 2 ν − s − 1 , n 3 q 2 ν−s−1 · q 2ν−m 0 −1 · N m 0 − 3, s 0 − 1; 2 ν − 2 .
2.11
Proof.
(1) Computation of n 1 .
By the transitivity of Sp 2v l F q on the set of subspaces of the same type, we can assume that 
Let Q be a subspace of type 2s 1 k, s, k contained in v 2 ⊥ and containing P . There
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It is easy to verify that Q 1 , Q 2 is a subspace of type 2 s − 1 , s − 1 in the 2 v − 2 -dimensional symplectic space. The number of this kind of subspace is denoted by N 2 s − 1 , s − 1; 2 ν − 2 , Q 3 arbitrarily. Furthermore, we may take Q 1 , Q 2 , Q 3 as 
where a s − 1 and b ν − s − 1, we have that
(2) Computation of n 2 .
Let U be a subspaces of type m 0 l, s 0 , l contained in v 2 ⊥ and containing a fixed subspace of type 2s 1 k, s, k which contains P , similar to 1 , we may assume that U has a matrix representation of the form 
where a s − 1, b ν − s − 1, so P 1 , P 2 is a subspace of type m 0 − 2s 1 , s 0 − s in the 2 v − s − 1 -dimensional symplectic space. We have that
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By the same method as that of 1 and 2 , let U 0 be a subspaces of type m 0 l, s 0 , l contained in v 2 ⊥ , containing P and not contained in v 1 ⊥ . We may assume that the subspace has a matrix representation of the form
So, the number of the subspaces Q 1 , Q 2 is denoted by N m 0 −3, s 0 −1; 2 ν −2 . Then, by the transitivity of Sp 2ν l F q on the set of subspaces of the same type, we can assume that 
where
Lemma 2.3. The number of the source states is
|S| q m 0 −2s−1 2s−1 l−k · N 2 s − 1 , s − 1; 2 ν − 2 · N m 0 − 2s 1 , s 0 − s; 2 ν − s − 1 · N k − 1, l − 1 N m 0 − 3, s 0 − 1; 2 ν − 2 .
2.22
Proof. Since |S| is the number of subspaces of type 2s 1 k, s, k contained in P 0 and containing P , we have |S| · n 3 n 1 · n 2 . 
Lemma 2.4. The number of the encoding rules of transmitter is
|E T | q m 0 −3 2 ν−2 2 l−1 · q 2ν−m 0 −1 − 1 . 2u 1 0, 0, a 3 , a 4 , a 5 , 1, 0, b 3 , b 4 , b 5 , 0, f 2 , u 2 0, 0, c 3 , c 4 , c 5 , 0, 1, d 3 , d 4 , d 5 , 0, g 2 .
2.25
Note that u 2 / ∈ P 0 and dim R ∩ p 0 3, so the vector u 1 cannot lie in P 0 . Then, a 5 , b 4 , b 5 cannot equal zero at the same time. Thus, the number of u 1 is q m 0 −3 l−1 q 2ν−m 0 −1 − 1 and that for u 2 is q 2 ν−2 l−1 ; we may get
2.26
Lemma 2.5. The number of the encoding rules of receiver is
Proof. |E R | is the number of type 2, 1, 0 intersecting 1 and R being the subspace of type 5, 2, 1 , we can assume
2.32
where 
Lemma 2.7. The number of the messages is
|M| |S||E T | q 4s−k 2 k−1 q − 1 .
2.38
Proof. For any m ∈ M, there is uniquely s ∈ S and e T ∈ E T satisfying m s e T ; the number of e T is a. Thus, 
Proof. Let M be a message, and let H v 2 , u be a receiver's encoding rule contained in M; we can assume that u 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 , and M has a matrix representation of the form 
If e R ⊂ m 1 ∩ m 2 , then thus the number of it is q k 1 −2 . So, it is easy to know that the number of e R contained in m 1 m 2 is
2 Assume that m 1 m 2 has the form of 2.46 , then, for any e R ⊂ m 1 m 2 , we can assume that 
2.55
Moreover, assume that the encoding rules e T and e R are chosen according to a uniform probability distribution, the largest probabilities of success for different types of deceptions:
2.56
Proof. 
where k 1 2s k.
3 Assume that R is transmitter's encoding rules, Q is a source state, and M R Q. Therefore, the number of receiver's encoding rules contained in R is q 3 . Let M be another message, such that M R Q and R / R . Then, e R contained R M is at most q. So,
4 From Lemmas 2.8 and 2.9, thus
5 Assume that the receiver declares to receive a message m 2 instead of m 1 , when s 2 contained in m 1 is different from s 2 contained in m 2 ; the receiver's substitution attack can be successful. Since e R ⊂ e T ⊂ m 1 , receiver is superior to select e T , satisfying e R ⊂ e T ⊂ m 1 , thus m 2 s 2 e T , and dim s 1 ∩ s 2 k 1 as large as possible. Therefore, the probability of a receiver's successful substitution attack is
The Second Construction
In this section, from singular symplectic geometry and the first construction, we construct an authentication code with a transmitter and multi-receivers and compute the probabilities of success for different types of deceptions. For the definition of multi-receiver authentication codes, refer to 9 . Let 2s ≤ 2s 0 < m 0 ≤ ν m 0 , m 0 < 2ν − 1, and 1 ≤ k < l. Let p be a subspace v 1 , v 2 , e 2ν 1 of type 3, 0, 1 in F 2ν l q , and let P 0 be a fixed subspace of type m 0 l, s 0 , l which contains P and orthogonal to v 2 , but not orthogonal to v 1 . Let S {s | s is a subspace of type 2s 1 k, s, k , P ⊂ s ⊂ P 0 }, Let E {e | e is a subspace of type 5, 2, 1 , e T 
3.6
Now, we compute the probability of substitution attack: we know that where k 1 2s k.
Two types of construction of authentication codes from singular symplectic geometry over finite fields are given. Among them, in the first construction, based on singular symplectic geometry structure of the authentication code with arbitration, the greatest probabilities of success for different types of deceptions are relatively lower, therefore there are some advantages. In addition, the second construction is based on singular symplectic geometry and is a multi-receiver authentication code. The probabilities of success for different types of deceptions are also computed. The results about multi-receiver authentication codes based on singular symplectic geometry are fewer. Thus, the structure of authentication code and the theory for further discussion are very meaningful.
